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I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing number of employment-related discrimination suits1 and
the costs -involved to fight those suits have prompted employers, the
judiciary, and Congress to seek alternatives to formal litigation.2 Employers
especially have sought alternatives since litigating a simple discrimination
See David C. Belt, Election of Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law:
Doorway into the Legal Hall of Mirrors, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 145, 145 (1995)
(noting that since the enactment of Title VII, the number of discrimination claims has
experienced a dramatic increase); Michael Schachner, Suits Send Employers Running For
Cover: New Statutes, Same Old Attitudes Create Liability Woes, Bus. INS., Nov. 21,
1994, at 57, 57 (noting that during the past 20 years, federal cases have risen 125% while
employment cases are up 2166%); R. Gaull Silberman et al., Alternative Dispute
Resolution of Employment Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. REv. 1533, 1535 (1994)
(stating that the major expansion of statutory rights and remedies has fueled and will
continue to fuel the trend to take workplace disputes to court); Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal
and Practical Implications of ADR and Arbitration in Employment Disputes, 11
HoFSTRA LAB. L.J. 247, 248 (1993) (noting that more than 18 million lawsuits are filed
each year and that a growing number of them are employment discrimination suits).
2 See Belt, supra note 1, at 146 (mentioning congressional endorsement of
alternatives to litigation in the Civil Rights Act of 1991); Silberman et al., supra note 1,
at 1536 (noting judicial support for alternatives to litigation). At the federal level, there
has been a major move toward alternatives to litigation, including adoption and
implementation of the following measures: (1) the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994), which requires federal courts to develop plans for speedy and
inexpensive resolutions to civil disputes; (2) the Negotiated Rule Making Act of 1990, 5
U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1994 & Supp. 1), which encourages facilitated negotiations in the
regulatory setting; (3) the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 571-584 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), which encourages federal agencies to use
alternatives to litigation; and (4) an executive order issued by former President George
Bush, Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1992), which endorses the use of
alternatives to litigation when resolving claims for or against the United States or its
agencies. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in
the United States Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 65, 82 (1996).
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suit can cost them between $50,000 and $80,0003 and take years to get from
complaint to trial.4 Beyond these costs, the employers have to deal with
workplace disruption, poor employee morale, and damaged reputation to the
company. 5 Employers therefore seek an alternative that not only decreases
the monetary costs and the time spent resolving discrimination complaints
but that also increases workplace harmony. 6
One alternative to formal litigation to which employers have turned is
alternative dispute resolution (ADR).7 ADR methods 8 are faster, less
3 See Jeffrey P. Ferrier, ADA and ADR: Approaching an Adequate Adjudicatory
Allocation, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1996) (citing Stephen W. Skrainka, The
Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Employment Manuals and Collective Bargaining
Agreements for Resolving Civil Rights, Age and ADA Claims, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 985,
992 (1993)).
4 See id. at 1281-82 (noting that "it can take years and thousands of dollars to get an
employment discrimination case from the complaint stage through discovery and finally
to trial"); see also Robert J. Lewton, Comment, Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration
Requirements a Viable Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory
Employment Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 993 (1996) (explaining that
"employers have painfully discovered the tremendous time and expense involved in
litigating [employment discrimination] claims").
5 See Lewton, supra note 4, at 993.
6 Representatives of the United States Postal Service (USPS) state that they want
more than just monetary benefits from their mediation program; they want workplace
harmony. See Lisa Bingham & Cindy Hallberlin, Postal Service Expanding Workplace
Dispute Program, CONSENSUS, Oct. 1998, at 1, 1. Referring to the USPS's mediation
program, a Postmaster General stated, "[w]e are looking for more than settlement rates.
The Postal Services strives to manage conflict more effectively, so that employees can
satisfactorily deal with their disputes and return their focus and energy to work." Id.
Bingham and Hallberlin report that in pilot programs, there was a 55%-75% settlement
rate in the mediations and an improvement in overall workplace relationships. See id. For
additional information on the USPS's mediation program, see infra Part IV.C.
7 See Ferrier, supra note 3, at 1281, 1306 (noting that as court dockets become more
crowded and employees file more discrimination suits, ADR increasingly becomes a
viable alternative to litigation); Dana Shaw, Mediation Certification: An Analysis of the
Aspects of Mediator Certification and an Outlook on the Trend of Formulating
Qualifications for Mediators, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 327, 328 (1998) ("A party can save
eighty percent of court and counsel costs through the mediation process, and the court
system benefits through a reduction in its workload."); Silberman et al., supra note 1, at
1536 (noting that employers increasingly are turning to internal ADR methods in part
because of a growing trend to extend to employees a greater opportunity to participate in
management); Lewton, supra note 4, at 993.
8 ADR methods include arbitration (third party makes a binding judgment),
mediation (neutral mediator facilitates discussion), negotiation (parties negotiate without
a third party or neutral), and various hybrid processes such as private judging, neutral
expert, minitrial, ombudsman, and summary jury trial. See STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG E7 AL.,
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expensive,9 and less disruptive to workplace relationships10 than formal
litigation. They also can, if implemented as an internal procedure, strengthen
the employer's position with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the courts, and their employees. 11 One ADR method
in particular, interest-based mediation, can help resolve disputes before
employers have to resort to the more costly and time-consuming ADR
processes,' 2 like arbitration. 13 Although the other ADR processes are less
costly and time consuming than litigation, successful mediation can stop the
DIsPuTE RESOLUTION 4-5 (2d ed. 1992).
9 See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 85 (noting that mediation's popularity arose in
part because it is speedier and less expensive than more elaborate ADR techniques).
Stipanowich notes that in his survey of public contracts attorneys, mediation was viewed
as the superior method for reducing dispute resolution time and expense. See id. at 148.
10 See Ferrier, supra note 3, at 1302 (noting that ADR tends to be less
confrontational than litigation and that the parties often exit the process feeling
victorious). Ferrier states that ADR offers employers an opportunity to work things out
with the employee. See id. If a settlement can be reached, Ferrier states, both sides have
saved time and expense. See id. Noting how ADR contributes to a less disruptive
workplace, Silberman states:
ADR contributes to employee morale by enabling managers and employees to
develop trust and respect, by allowing employees to take an active role in settling
disputes while preserving ongoing relationships, and by giving employees a forum
for their complaints before either side become too antagonistic or entrenched in a
particular position.
Silberman et al., supra note 1, at 1537.
11 See Silberman et al., supra note 1, at 1553. Silberman cites two cases, Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), and Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986), for the proposition that having an internal procedure allows an
employer, if he must resort to litigation, to strengthen his case before the EEOC and in
court. See Silberman et al., supra note 1, at 1553-54 & n.133. In Gardner-Denver, the
Supreme Court stated: "Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an
employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight." Gardner-
Denver, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. In Meritor, the Supreme Court noted that the employer's
grievance procedure against discrimination was relevant in determining employer liability
for sexual harassment. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 71.
12 Many times, a dispute resolution program will include more than one type of
ADR process. Typically, the first process will be a nonbinding procedure like mediation
or negotiation. If the first process does not work, the next step will be a more complex
and costly ADR procedure like arbitration or a minitrial. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra
note 8, at 409-10 (suggesting that when creating a dispute systems design, a designer
should arrange the procedures in a low-to-high cost sequence (mediation and negotiation
are listed as occurring at the low-cost end of the sequence)).
13 See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 80 (noting that in the construction industry,
arbitration is preferable to litigation but that the best alternative is mediation).
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process early, which saves the employer from spending time and money on
more complex ADR processes or litigation. 14 This is especially true in a
unionized workforce.
In a unionized workforce, where arbitration is used on a regular basis,
some of the characteristics that plague formal litigation-expensive, slow,
formal, and combative-have become characteristics of labor arbitration.15
In these unionized workforces, employers will have to look toward a process
like mediation to help save monetary and nonmonetary costs and time.
As for the nonmonetary costs, mediation in a unionized workforce
focuses on the individual problem of the parties and thus improves the
quality of the outcome16 and the overall work environment. 17 Labor
arbitration, on the other hand, is not focused on the individual problem and
thus does not improve the quality of the outcome and work environment like
mediation. 18 Rather, "as the grievance moves through the grievance
procedure, it is argued about less and less as a workplace problem, and more
and more as a matter of contract right." 19 As a result, the parties may end
labor arbitration with the same problem they had before arbitration.20
For a mediation to work effectively, advocates of mediation argue that
there must be confidentiality21 and a focus on the individual's problem. 22
14 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. If mediation is successful, the parties
do not have to move to the more costly ADR processes or to litigation.
15 See Stephen B. Goldberg, The Rise in Grievance Mediation, in PROCEEDINGS OF
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY THIRTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR
13-2, 13-2 (Richard Adelman ed., 1984) [hereinafter Goldberg, The Rise in Grievance
Mediation]. Describing the labor arbitration process, Goldberg states:
The labor arbitration process.., tends to be both slow and expensive. Delays of six
to nine months from the request for arbitration to the receipt of the arbitrator's
written decision are common, and costs are substantial, with the average arbitrator's
bill in excess of $1,300 per case. Adding the cost of the transcript, the briefs, and
attorney's fees, each party may spend more than $5,000 to arbitrate a grievance.
Complaints about excessive formality are also common.
Id; see also Stephen B. Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective
Bargaining Contract: An Alternative to Arbitration, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 270, 270 (1982);
Silberman et al., supra note 1, at 1539 (noting that because arbitration is a trial-like
process, it "may exacerbate the adversarial aspect of the parties' relationship").
16 See Goldberg, The Rise in Grievance Mediation, supra note 15, at 13-4.
17 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
18 See Goldberg, The Rise in Grievance Mediation, supra note 15, at 13-2.
19 Id.
20 See id.
21 See Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 441
n.3 (1984).
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This creates a conflict between the interests of the labor union and the
interests of the employee. While the employee will want to be involved in a
mediation that focuses on his problem and protects his right to
confidentiality, the union will want to be present and will be focused on the
collective interest. 23
The focus of this Note is on the conflicts that arise when the employer of
a unionized workforce institutes an informal, interest-based mediation
program,24 outside the union grievance process, to reduce the costs of
potential Title VII2 5 discrimination law suits. This conflict will arise when a
union employee, participating in an informal mediation, does not want union
representation. 26 Instead, the employee wants to pursue his own individual
rights and keep the mediation confidential from the union. On one hand,
advocates of mediation support the waiver of the union's representational
rights because confidentiality and focusing on individual interests are
essential to mediation. On the other hand, the union has a right under section
22 See Goldberg, The Rise in Grievance Mediation, supra note 15, at 13-4 (arguing
that a theoretical advantage of mediation it is that is problem-centered, unlike
arbitration).
23 See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1975) (pointing out that
at a confrontation, the union safeguards not only the particular employee's interest, but
the interests of the entire bargaining unit).
24 The focus of this Note is on mediation rather than other ADR processes because
this Note is dealing with the employment setting, in which the preservation of workplace
relationships is important, and mediation has been found to be particularly successful in
resolving disputes while preserving relationships. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HousE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND
OVERSIGHT, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
EMPLOYERS' EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 17 (1997) (noting that
mediation is particularly useful in employment discrimination cases); Silberman et al.,
supra note 1, at 1538 (noting that mediation is well suited to cases in which preservation
of an ongoing employment relationship is important); Stipanowich, supra note 2, at
150-51 (noting that in response to a survey, attorneys ranked mediation as the most
effective method of opening channels of communication and one of the most effective at
enhancing job relationships); see also id. at 85 (noting that mediation reopens channels
of communication and is therefore recommended for disputes, as in employment settings,
that involve continuing relationships). Mediation has proven to be so successful that the
EEOC will spend $13 million in fiscal year 1999 on its ADR program. See 'Significant'
Expansion of ADR Program in the Works, EEOC Chairwoman Castro Says, 67
U.S.L.W., No. 22, at 2342 (Dec. 15, 1998).
25 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq. (1994 & Supp. I1 1997).
26 This Note only deals with situations where the unionized employee does not want
union representation. If the employee wants union representation, then there is no
problem.
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9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 27 to be present at the
adjustment 28 of any grievance between the employee and employer29 and
thus may be able to force itself into an otherwise confidential process. 30
The remainder of this Note explores the current status of
representational rights under section 9(a) of the NLRA and presents
plausible arguments to limit that right in favor of confidentiality in
discrimination-related mediation. Part II briefly explains the mediation
27 National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994). The NLRA
covers private sector labor unions. See id. § 152.
28 Adjusting a grievance means settling or handling a grievance.
29 See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a). Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group
of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer
and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That
the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.
Id. (emphasis added).
30 The Supreme Court of the United States gave union members the right to waive
their Weingarten right in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975). The
Weingarten right is the right of an employee to have union representation in an
investigatory interview (as opposed to a disciplinary meeting where there is a mandatory
obligation to meet with the union representative) in which there is a risk of discipline.
See id. at 257, 260. Section 7 of the NLRA has been interpreted to give the Weingarten
rights. See id. at 260-64; see also 29 U.S.C. § 157. If there is no risk of discipline in such
an interview, and the union member does not want union representation, then the union,
theoretically, does not have to be present. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257-58.
An Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) precomplaint meeting is arguably like an
investigatory meeting (certainly not like a disciplinary meeting). However, the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has on many occasions held that the union has a section
9(a) right to be present at those meetings. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. & Am.
Postal Workers Union, Columbus Area Local, 281 N.L.R.B. 1015, 1016 (1986).
Therefore, at the precomplaint meeting, where interest-based ADR procedures could take
place, there will be no confidentiality from the union.
Although there is somewhat of a clash between Weingarten rights and the union's
section 9(a) rights, section 9(a) rights are explicitly clear that the union must be provided
with an opportunity to be present at the adjustment of grievances. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
Because mediations often end with the settlement of a grievance, the focus of this Note is
on the conflict section 9(a) causes between the individual right to confidentiality and the
collective right of the bargaining unit.
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process and emphasizes those elements that are most essential to the process.
Part UT sets out relevant National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decisions
and court cases that discuss the union's representational rights and its right
to have access to confidential information. Part IV lays out arguments to
limit the union's right to be present in informal mediation. Two of the
arguments under Part IV revisit the struggle between majoritarian rights and
individual rights. The third argument is based on the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act of 199631 (ADRA), which directs federal agencies to adopt
policies that address "the use of alternative means of dispute resolution and
case management. '32 In adopting these ADR processes, federal agencies are
directed by the ADRA to keep in confidence ADR communications. 33 Part V
lists alternatives to a total ban on union representation in discrimination-
related mediations. Part VI concludes that because confidentiality is
important to mediation, and because the United States Supreme Court has
held that individual employees have a special right to pursue their
discrimination complaints outside of the union process, the NLRB must
reconsider its interpretation of section 9(a) and limit the union's
representational rights in discrimination-related mediation.
I. DEFINING A SUCCESSFUL IEDIATION
Mediation 34 is an interest-based ADR procedure "in which a third party
assists the disputants in reaching agreement"35 and structuring future
relations.36 During mediation, parties "retain the power to shape both the
agenda for discussion and the ultimate agreement." 37
Mediation typically consists of the following overlapping stages:
introduction, presentation of viewpoints by each party, expression of
emotions, caucus discussion about confidential information and views about
settlement, and a possible agreement.38 Throughout these stages, the
31 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998)
32 5 U.S.C. § 571 note (Promotion of Alternative Dispute Resolution).
33 See 5 U.S.C. § 574(b).
34 Mediation has been in existence for nearly 4000 years. See Shaw, supra note 7, at
329. Mediation initially was used in biblical times to resolve disputes. See id.
35 WILIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO
CUT THE COSTS OF CoNFLiCr 6 (1993).
36 See Note, supra note 21, at 443.
37 Id. at 444.
38 See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY &
PRACTICE § 3:02 (2d ed. 1994).
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mediator39 "assists parties in discussing points of difference and agreement,
in clarifying interests, in identifying alternative resolutions, and in accepting
compromise, leaving to [the parties] the decision to accept or reject a
settlement." 40 Ultimately, mediation, at best, "turn[s] conflict into a
constructive process" and, at the least, "gives parties a chance to preserve
ongoing relationships or make the termination of a relationship less
destructive." 41
In order for the mediation to function properly, there must be an
atmosphere of trust, free of restraint and intimidation. 42 Scholars argue that
confidentiality is essential to create such an atmosphere.43 Confidentiality
allows the parties to be frank with each other 44 and to share freely their
39 The mediator is not like a judge. Rather, the mediator acts as a "catalyst" for the
mediation process. Note, supra note 21, at 444. The mediator does not compel
production of information and does not submit a judgment "by applying preordained
rules to the dispute after hearing reasoned argument." Id. William L. Ury, Jeanne M.
Brett, and Stephen B. Goldberg expound on what an effective mediator can do:
A mediator may be able to move the negotiations beyond name calling by
encouraging the disputants to vent their emotions and acknowledge the other's
perspective. A mediator can help parties move past a deadlock over positions by
getting them to identify their underlying interests and develop creative solutions that
satisfy those interests. Where each side is reluctant to propose a compromise out of
fear of appearing weak, the mediator can make such a proposal. Mediators are thus
well placed to shift the focus from rights or power to interests. Mediation can serve
as a safety net to keep a dispute from escalating to a rights procedure, such as
litigation, or to a power procedure, such as a strike.
William L. Ury et al., Designing an Effective Dispute Resolution System, 4 NEGOTIATION
J. 413, 420 (1988).
4 0 See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 38, § 3:02.
41 See Note, supra note 21, at 444.
4 2 See id. at 441 & n.2.
43 See id.; see also Shaw, supra note 7, at 334 (noting that confidentiality is
essential for full cooperation); Alan Kirtley, Best of Both Worlds: Uniform Mediation
Privilege Should Draw from Both Absolute and Qualified Approaches, DiSP. RESOL.
MAG., Winter 1998, at 5, 5 (noting that confidentiality is a cornerstone of mediation's
success which the author states is used as a means to "open up" the mediation
discussion).
For a discussion on mediation confidentiality laws, see Note, supra note 21, at 459
(concluding that rules protecting confidentiality in mediation will make it "easier and
safer for parties ... [to] settle their dispute outside the courthouse"), and see generally
Joshua P. Rosenberg, Note, Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality: Mediation Privilege and
Conflict of Laws, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 157 (1994).
44 See Note, supra note 21, at 445 (noting that an "[a]greement may be impossible if
the mediator cannot overcome the parties' wariness about confiding in each other during
these sessions").
[Vol. 15:2 2000]
CONFIDENTIALITY IN DISCRIMINATION-RELATED DISPUTE MEDIATION
interests and points of view so that the mediator is apprised of the parties'
positions and interests and is better able to perform her function. 45 As one
author states: "[B]ecause parties in mediation can discuss their dispute on
their own terms without confining themselves to issues and facts relevant to
a legal cause of action, they may discover the otherwise hidden causes of
conflict between them and arrive at a more satisfactory and lasting resolution
to the dispute."'46 If the scholars are correct that the parties need to be frank
and free to share with one another to reach a more satisfactory result, then
there are several reasons why union representation in a mediation in which
the employee does not want that representation can make the mediation
unsatisfactory.
For example, in an embarrassing situation, such as a graphic quid pro
quo sexual harassment dispute,47 a union representative will be one
additional person to whom the employee has to tell her humiliating story.48
Besides the employee having to share information she does not want the
union or anyone else to know, the union's presence may cause restraint and
intimidation on the part of management. As a result, management may be
less cooperative in the mediation due to the fear that the union representative
will know certain details prior to the filing of a formal grievance
complaint-a complaint that, as a result of the mediation, may never be
filed. Additionally, the parties may never agree to a settlement if they cannot
overcome their wariness about confiding in one another during the
mediation. 49 Thus, the "otherwise hidden causes of conflict between them ''50
will not arise, and the parties will not be able to "arrive at a more
satisfactory and lasting resolution to the dispute." 51
In addition, if confidentiality is not preserved, the informal nature of
mediation, which is key to a successful resolution, 52 will be diminished. 53 In
45 See id. (asserting that "[t]he efficacy of this factfinding process depends on the
mediator's ability to ensure the confidentiality of communications made to him").
46 Id. at 444 (citations omitted).
47 Quid pro quo sexual harassment is the exchange of sexual conduct for a tangible
employment benefit (e.g., sexual intimacy for a raise). See Michael J. Zimmer et al.,
CASES AND MATERIAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 627 (Richard A. Epstein et al.
eds., 4th ed. 1997).
48 See Silberman et al., supra note 1, at 1538 (noting that mediation is well suited to
cases in which confidentiality may be important to the complainant, like in a sexual
harassment case).
49 See Note, supra note 21, at 445.
50 Id. at 444.
51 Id.
52 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (using a chart to note that mediation and
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a unionized workforce, the mere presence of a union representative, who is
present as a representative of the interests of the entire bargaining unit, may
make the mediation longer, more complex, and thus more costly in time
spent by the employees in the mediation and in fees to the mediator. Thus,
although management and the employee are trying to get their problems
resolved quickly and get back to work, the presence of a union
representative, who has his own agenda, may hinder these goals.
Furthermore, the presence of a union representative may shift the focus
of the mediation from the interests of the parties to the interests of the entire
bargaining unit.54 Such a result is undesirable because a successful
mediation focuses on the interests of the individuals involved by getting
those individuals to discuss their problems and interests, not the problems
and interests of an entire bargaining unit.55
III. CURRENT REPRESENTATIONAL RIGHTS AS
INTERPRETED BY THE NLRA AND COURTS
The NLRA 56 affords unions the right to represent union members at the
adjustment of grievances. This representational right has been interpreted by
the NLRB 57 as giving to unions an absolute right to be present in mediations
even when significant individual rights are implicated, as in discrimination
complaints. What follows is one NLRB decision and a federal circuit court
case explaining why they believe the union's representational right is
without limitation. 58
negotiation are informal and unstructured, whereas litigation is formalized and highly
structured, and arbitration is procedurally less formal); Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 85
(noting that one explanation for mediation's popularity is because it is informal and
flexible).
53 See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 152 (noting that in a small claims
mediation in Maine, the greater the informality of the mediation, the less intimidating it
is, and noting that informality creates greater potential for reducing anger in mediation
than litigation).
54 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
55 See supra notes 16, 22 and accompanying text.
56 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994 & Supp. m
1997).
57 The Board is a three-member panel to which the NLRA delegates authority to
decide labor issues. See id. § 153(a)-(b).
58 These cases do not deal specifically with mediations. Rather, they deal with EEO
precomplaint conciliations (in which mediations took place) or informal meetings where
a settlement was reached between the employer and employee outside the presence of the
union. Both are analogous to mediation.
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Additionally, there are two cases laid out that deal strictly with the right
of an employer to keep confidential the names of employees who have filed
discrimination-related complaints with their employer. Although not dealing
directly with the union's right to be present at the adjustment of a grievance,
these cases do address majoritarian and individual rights and hold that
individuals do have some privacy rights over the union.
A. NLRB and Court Decisions on the Union's Representational
Rights
Section 9(a) of the NLRA allows individual employees or a group of
employees to approach their employer and have a grievance adjusted.59 It is
therefore permissible for the employer to set up a mediation program for
employees to use when they have a discrimination-related grievance. This
proposition is supported not only by the language of the NLRA but also by
the decisions in NLRB v. North American Aviation, Inc.,60 in which it was
held that the employer corporation had a right, if not a duty, to hear and
settle any grievance presented to it,61 and Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB,62 in
which it was held that section 9(a) does not give the union the exclusive
right to handle grievances. 63 During these settlements of grievances with the
A precomplaint conciliation, informal meeting, and mediation outside the presence
of a union all have the potential to result in the adjustment of a grievance and therefore
are targeted by section 9(a) of the NLRA.
5 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). See supra note 29 for the full text of this statute.
60 136 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1943).
61 See id. at 898. In this case, North American Aviation had informed its employees
that they could present any grievance to it and if no agreement was reached, they could
go to arbitration. The union claimed that, pursuant to the NLRA, it had a monopoly over
the treatment of grievances. See id. at 898-99. The court stated in a footnote:
It is well to appreciate that [the proviso of § 159(a)] is on its face a right
preserved to the employee. No doubt the reason for this is that under the scheme of
collective bargaining a bare majority controls the whole body of employees and that,
in this circumstance, the right should be preserved, to the individual (or a group) to
go to his employer with any grievance he may harbor notwithstanding any provision
in the collective agreement.
It may also be that the Congress intended, by this proviso, to assert the policy
that individuals or a group of individuals in spite of any agreement to the contrary
may possess the right of registering their grievances with the employer.
Id. at 899 n.2.
62 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
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employer, the NLRB and courts also have allowed the employee to sign
away all of her rights arising out of the grievance.64
The second proviso of section 9(a), however, states that the union
representative must be afforded an opportunity to be present at the
adjustment. 65 Because the first proviso allows the employee to approach his
employer, employers have argued that section 9(a) actually gives them the
right to adjust a grievance even in the union's absence. The NLRB in the
following cases, however, has rejected this argument by strictly construing
section 9(a) and finding that the majoritarian rights of the union are
important and take precedence over individual rights.
1. Bethlehem Steel Company
In Bethlehem Steel Company,66 the union brought an action against
Bethlehem Steel Company (Bethlehem Steel) for a violation of section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA.67 The union alleged that Bethlehem Steel was in
violation of the statute because it conditioned the execution of a contract on
the union's agreement to incorporate a clause permitting the union
representative to be present at the initial adjustment of grievances only if the
employee so requested. 68 This dispute was the sole unresolved issue of the
parties' 1947 contract negotiations. 69
Since Bethlehem Steel refused to accept the agreement without the
clause, the union signed with the understanding that it would go before the
63 See id. at 73. It was held that the union had the exclusive right only where the
grievance involves bargaining for the unit or the interpretation of a bargaining agreement.
See id. at 72-73.
64 In United States Postal Serv. & Nat'l Alliance of Postal & Fed. Employees Local
321, 234 N.L.R.B. 820 (1978), the NLRB allowed an agreement to settle a dispute
between the United States Postal Service and an employee that waived all rights to
grieve, to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, the EEOC, or the Veterans Preference
Act. See id. at 821. Because the employee did not agree to give up a protected concerted
activity, the panel found that the Postal Service, "in imposing such a condition on [the
employee] in exchange for reducing the discharge to a suspension, sought merely to 'buy
its peace' by preventing [the employee] from litigating the matter in the future." Id. at
821.
65 See National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994).
66 Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding Div., 89 N.L.R.B. 341 (1950).
67 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). This section states that "[iut shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer.., to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." Id.
68 See Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. at 341.
69 See id. at 341-42.
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NLRB. 70 The trial examiner,71 relying on the second proviso of section 9(a),
found that the union had a statutory right to be present at the adjustment of
grievances by any agent of the employer, and that Bethlehem Steel could not
insist on a clause that was in derogation of the union's right under the
NLRA.72 It was up to the union if it wanted to waive its right. The NLRB
agreed and stated:
Grievances are usually more than mere personal dissatisfactions or
complaints of employees and their adjustment frequently involves the
interpretation and application of the terms of a contract or otherwise affects
the terms and conditions of employment not covered by a contract. For this
reason, these matters are unquestionably the concern of the bargaining
representative. 73
The NLRB also stated that a grievance procedure is bargainable.74 Thus,
a union can bargain away its right to be present in the adjustment of certain
grievances between the employer and employee. 75 The union cannot,
however, be forced to limit or give up its right.76 Therefore, the union,
because of its duty to represent the majority, as opposed to the minority,
retains in this NLRB decision its power under section 9(a) to be present at
the adjustment of individual grievances between the employer and
employee. 77
2. United States Postal Service & American Postal Workers Union
One of the most significant NLRB decisions dealing with the rights of
individuals to settle their disputes in a confidential manner and the right of
the bargaining unit to be represented in settlement proceedings is United
States Postal Service and American Postal Workers Union, Columbus Area
70 See id. at 342.
71 The trial examiner is the person who issues an intermediate report.
72 See Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. at 342.
73 ld. at 344 (citations omitted).
74 See id. at 345.
75 The court in Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir. 1945), also held
that the Hughes Tool Company did not need to notify the union when an employee
presented grievances to foremen. See id. at 75. This was so held because the contract of
the union agreed that it did not need notification of grievances to foremen. See id. at 72,
75.
76 See Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. at 342.
77 See id.
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Local.78 In this consolidated case, the Columbus Area Local and the Phoenix
Area Local Unions brought suits against the United States Postal Service for
violation of sections 8(a)(1)79 and 8(a)(5)80 of the NLRA.
In the Phoenix Area Local Union case, four employees received formal
notification from their employer that their performance on a letter sorting
machine was unsatisfactory and that if they did not pass a required
examination within 30 days, they would lose their jobs. 81 Each employee,
claiming discrimination, initiated both the union's grievance procedure and
the EEO complaint procedure. 82
One of the four employees withdrew her complaint from the grievance
procedure and settled with the EEO counselor.83 The others submitted their
grievance to arbitration and entered settlement talks with the counselor. One
of the three denied the EEO settlement offer.84 Two accepted the EEO
settlement. Each woman was offered the right to have a representative
present; however, the union was not contacted and did not attend the
meetings. 85 In each case, the USPS stated that it would reserve the right to
assert the EEO settlement as a defense in any arbitration of the employee's
grievance. 86
In the Columbus Area Local Union case, a manual distribution clerk
received a parking ticket for parking in an unauthorized zone and, as a result,
received a five-day suspension without pay.87 She asserted that the ticket and
suspension were unfair and discriminatory, and she invoked the EEO
procedures and filed a grievance. She settled through the EEO procedures
without the presence of the union. 88 When the employee's grievance entered
78 281 N.L.R.B. 1015 (1986).
79 See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994)
(providing that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of
this title").
80 See id. § 158(a)(5) (providing that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer.., to refuse to bargain collectively with the representation of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title").
81 See United States Postal Serv. & Am. Postal Workers Union, 281 N.L.R.B. at
1021.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 1022.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.
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arbitration, the arbitrator agreed with the USPS that the settlement barred
him from hearing the case.89
Siding with the plight of the unions and the unions' duty to represent the
entire bargaining unit, the NLRB decided that the USPS violated the NLRA
"[b]y adjusting or attempting to adjust contract grievances with individual
unit employees without affording the employee's collective-bargaining
representative the opportunity to be present at such adjustments as required
by section 9(a) of the Act .... -90 After balancing privacy rights in
precomplaint meetings under the EEO regulations against the explicit
language of section 9(a), the Board held that the NLRA (bargaining unit
rights) prevails over the EEO regulations (individual rights).91
Calling special attention to the second proviso of section 9(a), the NLRB
held that the explicit language of the NLRA secures the bargaining
representative's right to be present, without limitation, when a grievance is
being adjusted.92 First, it noted that the "legislative history and the entire
statutory bargaining scheme disclose that the second proviso to Section 9(a)
was inserted in recognition of the bargaining representative's interest in
administering its contract. '93
The NLRB also stated that by adding in the second proviso of section
9(a), Congress expressed an intent that the institutional role of the collective-
bargaining unit not be subordinated to individual employees. 94 In
establishing this "regime of majority rule, Congress sought to secure to all
members of the unit the benefits of their collective strengths and bargaining
89 See id.
90 Id. at 1018.
91 See id. at 1016.
92 See id. at 1015.
93 Id.
94 See id. The NLRB went on to reference Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding Div.,
89 N.L.R.B. 341 (1950). See United States Postal Serv. & Am. Postal Workers Union,
281 N.L.R.B. at 1015. The NLRB noted that "the dangers of permitting an employee, or a
group of employees, the unqualified right to present and settle grievances" were set out in
the House of Representative debates on section 9(a), as follows:
To grant individual employees or a minority group of employees the right to present
and settle grievances which relate to wages, hours, and conditions of employment,
without permitting the representative of the majority of the employees to participate
in the conference and join in any adjustment is to undermine the very foundations of
the Act.
Id. at 1015-16 (quoting 93 CONG. REc. 3624 (1947) (statement of Rep. Lanham)).
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power, in full awareness that the superior strength of some individuals or
groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority. '95
Second, the NLRB found that the rationale for the anonymity
requirement was not applicable in this case. According to the NLRB, the
reason for anonymity is to protect the identity of the employee from
management, not the union.96 In this case, the employees initiated the EEO
procedure concomitantly with the union procedure; thus, the union was
already aware of the identities of the aggrieved employees. Accordingly, the
NLRB stated that "whatever validity the confidentiality requirement may
have in general, we do not find that it is sufficient to outweigh the Union's
clear statutory rights set forth in Section 9(a) of the Act."'97
All of the employees in this case filed grievances with the union. The
NLRB's holding addressed situations where the employee invoked both the
EEO and union grievance procedures. Notably, the court explicitly stated in
a footnote that it had not decided whether the union would have a right to be
present at the adjustment of a grievance with an individual employee who
did not also file a contract grievance.98
B. Court Decisions on Employees' Confidentiality Rights
In contrast to the preceding administrative adjudications, the following
federal circuit court cases upheld the privacy rights of the employee against
the majoritarian rights of the collective bargaining unit. However, these
cases do not deal directly with representational rights. Instead, they compare
the union's right to obtain access to the names of discrimination
complainants with the confidentiality rights of the individual employees.
95 Id. at 1016 n.7 (quoting Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975) (citing Vaca v. Spies, 380 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); J.I. Case
Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944); H.R. Res. 972, 74th Cong. (1934))).
96 See id. at 1016. The NLRB also noted that some of the employees who filed
contract grievances were not concerned with remaining anonymous to postal
management because they made direct contact with the Postmaster concerning the
complaints. See id. at 1016 n.9.
97 Id. at 1016.
98 See id. at 1018 n.13; see also Van Can Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 1085, 1087 (1991)
(stating that when a manager telephones an employee and makes a settlement without
extending to the union an opportunity to be present, the employer violates the NLRA);
Top Mfg. Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 424, 425 (1980) (noting that where an employer settles with
an employee after his grievance is adjusted through the union without notifying the
union, the employer violates the NLRA).
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1. International Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers v.
NLRB
In International Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers v.
NLRB,99 the Union, during a negotiation of the collective bargaining
agreement, requested that General Motors Corporation (GM) hand over a list
of all discrimination complaints filed against GM. 100 GM furnished the
Union with a listing of the number of complaints as well as the sex and race
of each complainant and the general subject matter of their complaints. The
Union demanded more detailed data but GM failed to respond. 01 The Union
then filed a charge against GM, and the NLRB found that GM had violated
the NLRA by failing to provide the information requested by the Union.10 2
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, the court considered, in part, whether the NLRB's conclusion that
GM's refusal to supply copies of discrimination complaints filed by union-
represented employees was an unfair labor practice. The court found that the
union did have a right to certain information, namely, information pertaining
to the type and frequency of complaints, because it would enable the union
to "properly negotiate and perform their agreement-created duties under the
anti-discrimination clauses."10 3 The court also found, however, that the
union did not have a right to the actual copies of the complaints which held
the name of the complainant and that the actual copies were not necessary to
provide the requested information.10 4 The court, recognizing the importance
of employees' feelings of comfort in filing confidential complaints, stated:
The Union seeks copies of complaints from the employer because the
complaining union member, presumably, has elected not to involve his
union. The filing of complaints would be inhibited if employees knew their
99 648 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
100 See id. at 21.
101 See id. at 21-22.
102 See id. at 22.
103 Id. at 25.
104 See id. at 27. In so holding, the court relied on the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Detroit Edison v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). In Detroit Edison, the
Court held that "[tihe sensitivity of any human being to disclosure of information that
may be taken to bear on his or her basic competence is sufficiently well known to be an
appropriate subject of judicial notice." Id. at 318.
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complaints would be given to a local union representative or fellow union
member who, in some cases, might be the very subject of the complaint. 105
The court further found that inhibiting the filing of employee complaints
and thus inhibiting the social progress for which the complaint procedure
strives is contrary to congressional intent 10 6 as set forth in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the EEOC regulations that prohibit public
officials from making complaints public. 10 7
2. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. NLRB
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. NLRB 108 reached a result similar to that reached by the
District of Columbia Circuit in International Union of Electric Radio &
Machine Workers. This case was on appeal from an NLRB order requiring
Safeway Stores, Inc. (Safeway) to provide the Union with information
concerning race and employment status.10 9 The Union requested the
information to ensure that the company was complying with the
nondiscrimination requirements of the bargaining agreement. 10
As a bargaining unit, the court stated, a union is entitled to information
which is relevant to its duty to administer the collective bargaining
agreement. 111 The test for relevancy is a liberal one; if the information
would aid the union in performing its statutory duties, it is relevant. 112
However, the court stated that "[e]ven when the information is objectively
relevant,. . . a union's request may be denied if its compilation would be
unduly burdensome or if the employer's interest in its confidentiality
105 International Union of Elec. & Mach. Workers, 648 F.2d at 27.
106 See id.
107 See id. The court stated that "[t]he board's dismissal of these provisions, merely
on the ground that they do not bind private citizens, did not... pay sufficient deference
to the public policy underlying those provisions." Id. The court went on to state that the
conclusion that a union can force an employer to do what the law prohibits of public
officials is unwarranted. Such a conclusion, according to the court, would nullify the
protection of union member complainants intended by Title VII and EEOC regulations.
See id.
108 691 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1982).
109 See id. at 953.
110 See id. at 956.
111 See id.
112 See id.
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outweighs the union's interest." 113 Thus, according to this court, even if the
union's request was made pursuant to its statutory duty to enforce the
collective bargaining agreement, if the confidentiality interest outweighs the
union's interest then majoritarian rights are subordinated to individual
rights. 114
International Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers and
Safeway Stores at first glance appear to support the proposition that section
9(a) representational rights should be limited when it comes to privacy in
discrimination-related proceedings. If it does, however, it does so in an
indirect way. Proponents of majoritarian rights will argue that these cases do
not deal with section 9(a) representational rights and thus do not allow
employers to keep unions out of mediations. Advocates of individual rights,
on the other hand, will argue that these holdings imply that individuals have
confidential rights when participating in any discrimination procedure
outside the union process and that if the union has any rights, it is the right to
know how many complaints were filed and other general information.
C. Summary
The NLRB decisions and circuit court cases have set out the following:
(1) that the employee, pursuant to section 9(a), can approach management
with a grievance and that management can adjust that grievance as long as it
does not contradict the collective bargaining agreement; (2) that the
settlement between the employer and employee can waive all of the
employee's rights coming out of the particular grievance; (3) that the union
can waive its right to be present at grievances; and (4) that the employer can
hold in confidence the names of the employees who have filed complaints
with management to protect those employee's privacy rights. Thus, the
NLRB and court cases have recognized, to some small degree, that
individual employees do have a right to settle grievances and that they have
the right to keep in confidence their discrimination complaints.
However, the NLRB still holds that pursuant to section 9(a) a union
113Id
114 Safeway differs from International Union of Electrical Radio & Machine
Workers slightly. Safeway states that it is okay simply to erase the names of the
complainants. See id. at 958. In International Union of Electrical Radio & Machine
Workers, the court states that deletion of the names is not enough. See International
Union of Elec. Radio, 648 F.2d at 26. "The mere deletion of complainant names ... does
not sufficiently insure the confidentiality of their complaints. In many instances a reading
of the complaint would allow one familiar with the work environment to identify the
complainant." Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
representative has a right to be present at the adjustment of grievances.
Consequently, mediations implemented by an employer of a unionized
workforce may suffer from the lack of a major element: confidentiality. As a
result, the mediations will be focused less on the individual parties and how
they feel and more on finding a solution that will benefit the entire
bargaining unit. Furthermore, the mediations might lose their informal
nature. 115 What likely will result is an alteration in the nature of mediation.
Where unions are involved, mediation will not look like the interest-based
ADR procedure that ADR scholars support and therefore will lack the results
of a pure mediation program.116
Although this paints a bleak picture for employer-initiated mediation
programs in union settings, hope still remains. There is a loophole in the
NLRB's decision in American Postal Worker's Union, in which the Board
held that there is no need for confidentiality when the employee invokes
both the EEO and union grievance proceedings. 17 The NLRB found, in part,
that because the Union was already aware of the identities of the grievants,
whatever validity confidentiality might have was sufficient to outweigh the
union's statutory rights under section 9(a). The NLRB explicitly stated that
it was not considering the scenario where an employee had not invoked both
the EEOC and the union grievance proceedings. Thus, the NLRB's holding
in United States Postal Service & American Postal Workers Union is
inapplicable in situations where an employee submits to a mediation without
invoking the union procedure."18 This fact that the employer could keep the
names of the complainants confidential, taken together with the holdings in
International Union of Electric Radio & Machine Workers and Safeway
115 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
116 See supra Part II.
117 See United States Postal Serv. & Am. Postal Workers Union, 281 N.L.R.B.
1015, 1016 (1986).
118 See id. at 1026. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who was overruled by the
NLRB in International Union of Electric Radio & Machine Workers, did consider
situations in which the employee had not invoked both the EEO and union grievance
procedures. See id. The AL held that
to read Section 9(a) of the Act as broadly as the General Counsel argues would
require that the Postal Service give the Union the right to be present at all EEO pre-
complaint sessions even when the individual is asserting no contract violation and
opposes the Union's presence. I do not believe that the EEO process mandated by
Title VII and the EEOC regulations-with the specific admonition to the Postal
Service to guard the anonymity of the complainant-could easily survive such
mandatory participation by the Union without significant risk of altering its nature
and function.
Id.
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Stores, may be helpful, initially, in persuading the Board and courts to
reconsider confidentiality in pregrievance mediation.
Something stronger than loopholes in an NLRB decision and indirect
court decisions, however, will be needed to persuade fully the NLRB and
courts to limit a union's statutory representational right in discrimination-
related mediation. The following Part lists three such arguments.
IV. THE UNION'S REPRESENTATIONAL RIGHTS SHOULD BE LIMITED IN
FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYEE' S RIGHT TO CONFIDENTIALITY
There is strong precedent from the NLRB and clear language in section
9(a) that supports an unlimited representational right for unions. To
overcome this precedent and language, employers and employees must argue
that employees have a statutory and public policy right that limits the
union's representational guarantees. The following discussion lays out three
arguments that should persuade the NLRB and courts, when weighing the
union's statutory rights against any rights the employee may have, to tip the
balance in favor of confidentiality for the employees.
The first argument revisits the continuing debate over the individual
right to pursue the resolution of discrimination claims outside of the union
process and the institutional obligation of the union to represent the entire
bargaining unit. The United States Supreme Court and lower court case law
emphasize congressional intent to protect individual rights, as opposed to
majoritarian rights, under Title VII. If the Supreme Court recognized that
individuals can pursue their Title VII claims outside the union process in
federal court, then no reason exists for denying individuals the right to
mediate their discrimination claims outside of the union process and without
the union's presence. This argument has become particularly compelling
since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in which Congress
expressly endorses alternative dispute resolution to resolve discrimination
disputes. 119
Secohd, the public equivalent of the NLRB, the Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA), which is controlled by the Federal Service Labor
Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), 120 has held that the individual
right to grieve discrimination complaints through the EEOC trumps
majoritarian rights, and thus union representatives cannot force themselves
119 See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994 & Supp. III
1997) (Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution).
120 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101 et seq. (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
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into precomplaint meetings. 121 Following congressional intent that
individuals have special rights to pursue discrimination claims, the FLRA
has held that an employee's right to confidentiality is upheld against the
right of the union to be present. 122 The argument, therefore, is that if public
employees have a right to a confidential discrimination-related mediation,
then private employees who, like public employees, benefit from Title VII
guarantees, should also have the right. There is no reason to have separate
policies.
Third, there is an apparent conflict between the ADRA confidentiality
clauses 123 and the representational rights of the union. Because the USPS,
controlled by the NLRA, 124 is a federal agency, it must comply with the
ADRA's mandate that it attempt to resolve controversies through ADR
processes instead of resorting to the overcrowded court system. In complying
with the ADRA, the USPS must keep mediation communications
confidential. Therefore, as long as the USPS's mediation program is in
compliance with the ADRA, the USPS has a statutory duty, and USPS
employees have a statutory right, to keep mediations confidential.
A. Expanding Individual Rights to Discrimination-Related Mediations
Pursuant to the NLRA, a majority of the employees in a unit can elect a
representative who will have the exclusive right to bargain with the
employer on that unit's behalf.125 By creating this system of employee
organization and collective bargaining, Congress intended to "promote
industrial peace and the improvement of wages and working conditions."' 26
Consequently, the interests of individual employees will be subordinated to
the collective interests of the majority. 127 Additionally, Congress and the
Supreme Court have developed a policy favoring the use of arbitration as the
121 See Peter Marksteiner, How Confidential Are Federal Sector Employment-
Related Dispute Mediations?, 14 OHIo ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 89, 105-41 (1998)
(discussing, inter alia, IRS, Fresno Serv. Ctr. v. FLRA, 706 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983)).
122 See id.
123 See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 574 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
124 The USPS is covered by the NLRA pursuant to the Postal Reorganization Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 3, 5, 12, 15-18, 22,
31, 39, 40, 42 U.S.C.).
125 See National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994).
126 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
127 See id.
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dispute resolution process of unionized workforces. 128 Although Congress
and the Supreme Court have promoted majoritarian rights and arbitration in
the unionized workforce, they also have recognized explicitly an
independent right to pursue statutory claims outside of the union's grievance
and arbitration process and without union representation. 129 Thus, where an
employee feels that he has been discriminated against, the majoritarian rights
of the bargaining unit do not prevail against him, and he therefore may go
outside of the union process to seek resolution of his claim.
It was in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 130 that the Supreme Court
compared the rights of the majority to those of the individual in a
discrimination claim. In performing such a comparison, the Court stated that
Title VII rights are different and separate from the section 9(a) rights of the
union. Specifically, the Court stated that Title VII "stands on plainly
different ground; it concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's
right to equal employment opportunities.' 131
Gardner-Denver dealt with a unionized employee's right to bring a
claim in federal court after going through the union arbitration process. The
Court held that an employee's statutory right to trial de novo is not
foreclosed by prior submission to final arbitration under a collective
bargaining agreement. 132 Thus, the employee can, outside of the union
process and without union representation, take his discrimination claim to
federal court. The Court so held because Title VII "make[s it] plain that
federal courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure compliance with
Title VII.' 33
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner-Denver, Congress has
amended Title VII to include alternative dispute resolution, in addition to
12 8 See Joshua J. Morrow, Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.:
Shattering Discriminated Union Members' Choice of Judicial Forum, 14 LAB. LAW. 143,
144 (1998). The Supreme Court developed this policy in the Steelworker Trilogy. See
generally United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
129 See McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 285-92 (1984) (holding
that claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not precluded by compulsory arbitration);
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728-45 (1981) (holding that
claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act are not precluded by compulsory arbitration);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (holding that claims under
Title VII are not precluded by compulsory arbitration).
130 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
131 Id. at51.
132 See id. at 59-60.
133 Id. at 45.
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litigation, as a statutory remedy. 134 Therefore, in accordance with the
reasoning of Gardner-Denver, employees now have a congressionally
mandated statutory right to submit, if they want, to ADR outside of the union
grievance process and without union representation. Even before this
amendment, Title VII gave employees a significant role in pursuing their
own discrimination claims before turning to the courts: "Individual grievants
usually initiate the [EEOC's] investigatory and conciliatory [mediation]
procedures.... In such cases, the private litigant not only redresses his own
injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against
discriminatory employment practices." 135 An employee, therefore, even
before the amendment, could carry out the purposes of the Act by
"redress[ing] his own injury" in a conciliatory meeting or mediation before
having to resort to court.
In finding that Congress favors individual rights in the discrimination
context, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have pointed to, among
others, the following two reasons that the union cannot interrupt or prevent
individual employees from pursuing their own discrimination claims: (1)
contractual rights and statutory rights are separate and distinct, and (2) the
union cannot waive, in a bargaining agreement, an employee's statutory
right.
In Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court stated that when an employee
submits her grievance to arbitration, the employee is seeking to vindicate her
contractual right under the collective-bargaining agreement. 136 By contrast,
when filing a suit under Title VII, the employee is seeking to exercise her
independent statutory right accorded by Congress. 137 And, expanding the
argument to the 1991 amendments, when submitting to mediation or another
ADR process outside of the union's grievance and arbitration procedure, the
employee also seeks to exercise a statutory, not contractual, right.
The argument over the contractual and the statutory right is an argument
134 See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994 & Supp. III
1997) (Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution). Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 states: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation,
facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title." Id.;
see also Silberman et al., supra note 1, at 1533 (noting that Congress's endorsement of
ADR in Title VII "indicates a significant shift in congressional and public attitudes about
the adequacy and effectiveness of" ADR).
135 Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 45 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970 & Supp. II 1972) (amended 1991)).
136 See id. at 49.
137 See id. at 49-50.
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over majoritarian and individual fights. The contractual right is the "reality
of a majoritarian conception of workers' rights,"'138 whereas the statutory
right is designed to provide "minimum substantive guarantees to individual
workers."139 Because there are differing policies behind these rights and
because Title VII's policy expresses special fights for individuals, it is up to
the individual if he wants to pursue his claim as a contractual right or as a
statutory right. 140 Pursuant to Gardner-Denver, his choice of forum---court
or private mediation-trumps the majority.1 4 1
In Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 14 2 the opinion for which was written by
Chief Judge Richard Posner, the Seventh Circuit held that an employee's
statutory rights are subject to the union's process only when the employee
consents. 143 The union, therefore, cannot "consent for the employee by
signing a collective bargaining agreement that consigns the enforcement of
statutory rights to the union-controlled grievance and arbitration machinery
created by the agreement."'144 Thus, the employee is free to go outside of the
"union-controlled grievance machinery" to seek resolution of his
discrimination claim in an employer-initiated mediation.
The Eleventh Circuit in Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Engineering
Corp.,145 like the Pryner court, held that an employee cannot be stopped
from pursuing his statutory claim in court unless he, not the union, decides to
138 Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1997).
139 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728,737-38 (1981).
14 0 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 49.
141 See id.
142 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997).
143 See id. at 363; see also Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1431 (10th
Cir. 1997) (holding that an employee does not have to complete the union grievance
process before bringing discrimination claims); Varner v. National Super Mkts., Inc., 94
F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that an employee who has chosen not to
participate in the union grievance procedure but completely to move outside of the that
process can do so rightfully to pursue her Title VII claim).
144 Pryner, 109 F.3d at 363 (emphasis omitted). The court also stated:
The essential conflict is between majority and minority rights. The collective
bargaining agreement is the symbol and reality of a majoritarian conception of
workers' rights.... The statutory rights at issue in these two cases are rights given
to members of minority groups because of concern about the mistreatment... of
minorities by majorities.... [W]e may not assume that [the union] will be highly
sensitive to their special interests, which are the interests protected by Title VII ....
Id. at 362.
145 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997).
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arbitrate the claim. 146 The court stated that because the statutory right was
designed to provide guarantees to individual employees and the union was
designed to protect the majority, the union could not waive an individual
employee's right to bring an action in federal court. 147 Thus, the employee
has a right to pursue her own discrimination complaint without union
participation or representation.148
Against this strong congressional and judicial support for the individual
right to go outside of the union process to resolve discrimination claims,
opponents of individual rights have argued that the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 149 overrules Gardner-
Denver and takes away the employee's right to choose statutory over
contractual rights. 150 Those opponents, however, are wrong.' 51
In Gilmer, the Court held that an employee could be compelled to
arbitrate her statutory claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).152 The Supreme Court took special care to distinguish Gilmer
from Gardner-Denver. It held that Gardner-Denver dealt with a bargaining-
unit employee who was compelled to arbitrate under a collective bargaining
agreement and not under an employment contract. 153 Under the bargaining
agreement, the Court noted, the employee does not personally agree to
arbitrate, as under an employment contract, nor does the employee have
representation by his own personal advocate. 154 Thus, although the Court
held that an employee who agrees to arbitrate under an employment contract
must arbitrate, bargaining unit employees, whose union has agreed to
arbitrate discrimination claims, still can go outside of the union process to
resolve their discrimination claim.155
146 See id. at 526-27. The court also stated that the employee could not be prevented
from bringing suit in court if the arbitrator was not specifically authorized to resolve
federal statutory claims or if the agreement gives the employee the right to pursue an
arbitration if the claim is not resolved in the grievance process. See id.
147 See id. at 537.
148 See id.
149 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
150 See id. at 35.
151 See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
152 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23; see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. M 1997).
153 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
154 See id.
155 See Morrow, supra note 128, at 149. Although the Supreme Court in Gilmer was
clear that it was not overruling Gardner-Denver, one circuit court, the Fourth Circuit in
Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996), has held
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Thus, after Gilmer, there is Supreme Court support, in addition to
congressional support and lower federal court support, for individual rights
under Title VII that are separate and distinct from the majoritarian rights that
section 9(a) of the NLRA strives to protect. Through the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Congress has extended to bargaining unit employees the right to
resolve their discrimination claims, if they so choose, in mediation and other
ADR processes outside of the union's grievance and arbitration process. The
NLRB therefore must abandon its precedent and hold that in employer-
initiated mediations dealing with discrimination, the union's section 9(a)
right succumbs and allows an employee, if he elects, to move outside of the
union process and deny union representation. As stated in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority156:
Congress has explicitly decided that a conflict between the rights of
identifiable victims of discrimination and the interests of the bargaining unit
must be resolved in favor of the former. Title VII... provides that the right
of an aggrieved employee to complete relief takes priority over the general
interests of the bargaining unit.... Similarly, a direct conflict between the
rights of an exclusive representative... and the rights of an employee
victim of discrimination should also presumably be resolved in favor of the
latter. 157
Allowing the union to succumb will ensure that the employee has a full
opportunity to pursue her statutory right to combat discrimination
unencumbered by the union representative's motives 158 and to take
advantage of her right to confidentiality which is essential to a successful
mediation.
that Gilmer did overrule Gardner-Denver and that union employees no longer can choose
statutory rights over contractual rights. See id. at 880; see also 137 CONG. REC. H9505,
9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Edwards) (stating that there is no
approval of Gilmer); Morrow supra note 128, at 160 (concluding that "[u]ntil the
Supreme Court or Congress say [sic] otherwise, lower courts should follow Gardner-
Denver and rule that an employee's rights under a [collective bargaining agreement] are
independent of statutory rights and that an employee may choose to sue under either or
both rights").
156 774 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1985). This case deals with a public union under the
FSLMRS.
157 Id. at 1189 n.12 (emphasis omitted).
158 The union's motives are to represent the entire bargaining unit rather than just
the individual employee. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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B. The NLRB Should Follow the FLRA 's Decisions Upholding
Individual Rights over Majoritarian Rights
Finding great weight in individual rights under Title VII, the FLRA has
held that union representatives do not have the right to attend informal EEO
precomplaint meetings (in which mediations take place). 159 The FSLMRS,
under which the FLRA operates, regulates public unions in virtually the
same manner as the NLRB regulates private unions. Like the NLRA, the
FSLMRS does not have an exception to the union's representational rights
for confidential mediations. 160 The Authority, however, has carved out such
an exception.161
One difference between the two acts centers around their provisions for
union representation. The FSLMRS states that the union shall have an
opportunity to attend "any formal discussion between one or more
representatives of the agency and one or more employees in the unit...
concerning any grievance or any personnel policy or practices or other
general condition of employment."' 162 The NLRB does not state that the
discussion needs to be formal, just that the union should have an opportunity
to be present where there is an adjustment of a grievance. 163
In a study of the FSLMRS and the right to confidentiality in mediation,
it was found that "[a]t least two circuit courts and the [FSLRA] have stated
in dicta that in the event of a conflict between an EEO complainant's right to
exclude the union from settlement discussion and a union's right to be
present,. . . the EEO complainant's privacy rights trump the union's
representational rights."'164
In Columbia Typographical Union No. 101,165 a unionized employee
filed an EEO complaint alleging sexual discrimination. As in the NLRB
decision discussed in Part BII of this note, the employee settled with the EEO
officer. 166 The union did not have notice of the settlement. 167 The union
brought suit against the company stating that it improperly negotiated with a
159 See Marksteiner, supra note 121, at 105-41.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) (1994).
163 See Marksteiner, supra note 121, at 110.
164 Id. at 142.
165 23 F.L.R.A. 35 (1986).
166 See id. at 35-36.
167 See id. at 45. The settlement occurred on March 23. The union received notice of
the settlement on March 28. See id.
510
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unionized employee during the informal adjustment of her EEO
complaint. 168 In response to the suit, the FLRA stated that individual
employees have a right to participate in the informal adjustment of their
complaint. 169 It then quoted the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, which stated that Congress has been explicit in deciding
that a conflict between an individual employee claiming discriminatory
violations and the interests of the majority must be resolved in favor of the
former. 170 It also cites an appeal from an NLRB decision, International
Union of Electric & Machine Workers,171 for the proposition that an
individual discrimination complainant's right to confidentiality is paramount
to the union's right to have the complainant's name. 172
The FLRA in Columbia Typographical Union recognized that when an
employee participates in an EEO procedure there might be a spill over into
the bargaining unit's interest. 173 It stated that "while a union has no right to
participate in the informal adjustment of an EEO complaint where a
bargaining unit employee has elected to pursue the compliant,... [the
union] may have a role if the settlement gives rise to an impact on the
bargaining unit." 174 Interpreting this passage, a commentator stated that the
most reasonable understanding is that while the union does not have a right
to be present at EEO settlement discussions, the union does have a right to
bargain with the employer over any impact the settlement may have on other
union members. 175
The FLRA decisions and court cases dealing with public unions have
abided by Gardner-Denver and congressional intent in allowing public
employees to seek resolution of their complaints in settlement meetings
168 See id. at 35.
169 See id. at 39; see also IRS, Fresno Serv. Ctr. v. FLRA, 706 F.2d 1019, 1023-24
(9th Cir. 1983) (finding that because the EEOC characterizes a precomplaint conciliation
as informal, the union had no right to be present).
170 See Columbia Typographical Union, 23 F.L.R.A. at 39 (quoting National
Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 774 F.2d 1181, 1189 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). In
National Treasury Employees Union, the court stated that the union's role is more
restricted in employee statutory procedures. See National Treasury Employees Union,
774 F.2d at 1188. Marksteiner states that the court "essentially says if this were a case
wherein an EEO complainant did not want the union present, the individual's interest
would prevail over the union's." See Marksteiner, supra note 121, at 113.
171 648 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
172 See Columbia Typographical Union, 23 F.L.R.A. at 39 n.5 (citing International
Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 648 F.2d at 27).
173 See id. at 40.
174 Id.
175 See Marksteiner, supra note 121, at 118.
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without union representation. The NLRB should follow suit. Gardner-
Denver does not distinguish between public and private employees; instead
it holds that unionized employees in general have a statutory right to pursue
the resolution of their discrimination claims outside of the union process.
And the Civil Rights Act of 1991 encourages employees, both public and
private, to pursue that resolution through alternative means of dispute
resolution. If the FLRA and courts have interpreted Gardner-Denver and the
Civil Rights Act as allowing public employees to participate in a
discrimination-related settlement conference without the union, then the
NLRB should not draw a distinction and keep this same right from private
employees.
C. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990-Statutory Right to
Confidentiality
As a federal agency, the USPS 17 6 has an additional argument: a statutory
mandate for confidentiality in ADR. The ADRA requires federal agencies to
"adopt a policy that addresses the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution and case management."' 177 In implementing the ADR process, the
ADRA directs federal agencies to keep in confidence dispute resolution
communication. 178
Originally enacted in 1990, the ADRA supplies alternatives to the
"increasingly formal, costly, and lengthy [administrative proceedings]
resulting in unnecessary expenditures of time and in a decreased likelihood
of achieving consensual resolution of disputes." 179 The ADRA requires the
following four elements of a dispute resolution program:
First, the Act covers use of alternative means of "dispute resolution
[process,]" which by definition includes mediation. Second, the process
must be employed to resolve "an issue in controversy," the definition of
17 6 USPS employees account for 30% of all federal employees and account for 50%
of all federal EEO complaints. See Bingham & Hallberlin, supra note 6, at 1. Employing
almost 900,000 people, the USPS receives from 25,000 to 30,000 requests for
precomplaint counseling. See id.
177 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 571 note (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998) (Promotion of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution).
178 See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 574 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998). As a matter of fact, the 1996 amendments made a significant change by
expanding the disclosure protections to communications made to and from ADR neutrals
in mediation and other ADR processes. See id. For a discussion on this change, see
Contract Law Note, ARMY LAW., July 1997, at 34, 34.
179 5 U.S.C. § 571 note (Congressional Findings).
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which clearly covers EEO complaints of discrimination.... Third, a neutral
will be appointed to serve as "a conciliator, facilitator, or mediator ... at the
will of the parties....." Fourth, the parties who will participate in the
process should be clearly identified. 180
The neutral, pursuant to the ADRA, "shall not voluntarily disclose or
through discovery or compulsory process be required to disclose any dispute
resolution communication or any communication provided in confidence to
the neutral.' 181
The confidentiality provision in the ADRA conflicts with section 9(a) of
the NLRA. Whereas the ADRA promotes confidentiality, the NLRA gives
the union the right to have notice of and an opportunity to be present at the
adjustment of an employee grievance. Thus, if a USPS employee attempts to
take part in a pregrievance mediation and wants to preserve informality and
confidentiality by keeping the union representative out, the ADRA certainly
will support such a decision whereas the NLRA will not.
This conflict between the ADRA and the NLRA is a timely concern for
the USPS. By the year 2000, the USPS plans to launch nationally its Resolve
Employment Disputes, Reach Equitable Solutions Swiftly program
(REDRESS). 182 The program will implement mediation as an alternative to
the traditional EEO complaint process. 183 When employees request
mediation, their case will be referred to an outside mediator who will
mediate the dispute within approximately two weeks of the request.1 84
REDRESS appears to be in compliance with the four elements that the
ADRA requires of a dispute resolution program.1 85 First, the mediation
program is a dispute resolution process.' 86 Second, the program deals with
issues in controversy-discrimination disputes. 187 Third, the program will
180 Marksteiner, supra note 121, at 101-02 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 571(3), (8), (10)
(alteration in original)).
181 5 U.S.C. § 574(a).
182 See Bingham & Hallberlin, supra note 6, at 1; see also Lisa B. Bingham,
Mediating Employment Disputes: Perceptions of REDRESS at the United States Postal
Service, REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN., Spring 1997, at 1, 20 (describing the REDRESS
pilot programs).
183 See Bingham, supra note 182, at 20. Bingham notes that interest-based
mediation is a positive alternative to the traditional adversarial EEO complaint process.
See id. at 29.
184 See Bingham & Hallberlin, supra note 6, at 1.
185 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
186 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
187 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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appoint neutrals. 188 The last requirement, that the parties who participate
will be clearly identified, is not clear. 189 If this last requirement is fulfilled,
then REDRESS will be an ADRA program and will benefit from the
ADRA's confidentiality provisions. The program also allows employees to
bring advocates to the mediation representation, including union
representatives. 190 But what if the employee does not want the union to
attend?
If REDRESS complies with the ADRA, then in addition to arguing
individual rights under Gardner-Denver, arguing individual rights
underlying the decisions relating to public employees under the FSLMRS,
and arguing congressional encouragement for Title VII disputes to be
resolved through ADR, the employer and employee can argue that in
pursuing the resolution of the employee's complaint "through a system
Congress intended to be confidential[, the employee] may exclude the union
from private caucuses [191  between himself and the mediator without having
the [employer's] acquiescence [violate section 9(a)]. ' '192
V. ALTERNATIVES TO A TOTAL BAN ON THE
UNION'S REPRESENTATIONAL RIGHTS
This Note has presented several compelling reasons for the NLRB to
reconsider how section 9(a) affects confidentiality in discrimination-related
mediations. In reconsidering the union's right to be present, the NLRB must
remember that banning the union is not a wholesale abandonment of the
union's right. The union is still able to bargain over any settlements which
impact the majority during collective bargaining negotiations, and the union
is still protected by the proviso of section 9(a) that states that any settlement
made cannot be contrary to the union contract. If, however, the NLRB is not
188 See supra note 180 and accompanying text; see also Bingham, supra note 182,
at 9 (noting that the program will use outside neutrals to serve as mediators). REDRESS
will be the nation's largest program using outside neutrals to mediate EEO complaints.
See id. at 1.
189 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
190 It is the employee's Weingarten right to have a union member at an
investigatory-type meeting with the employer. See supra note 30.
191 A caucus is the part of mediation where the individual parties meet with the
mediator separately to discuss confidential information. See Ernie Odon, The Mediation
Hearing: A Primer, in MEDIATION CONTEXTS AND CHALLENGES 5, 12-13 (Joseph E.
Palenski & Harold M. Launer eds., 1986). This Note assumes that if the union must be
present at a pregrievance mediation as a representative of the employee, then the
representative also will sit in on the caucus.
192 See Marksteiner, supra note 121, at 144.
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prepared to ban totally union representatives from confidential mediations,
then perhaps one of the following alternatives to a total ban would be more
acceptable.
One alternative is to allow union presence with proper restraints. The
union member will be restrained from speaking of anything heard in the
mediation or using it in any way against management in the union grievance
process. The union representative also will be restrained from intervening
during settlement discussions. This proposition will not work, though, if the
employee, no matter the constraint, does not want the union representative
present. Furthermore, the union representative's presence, even if restrained,
still could prove to be a barrier to communication. 193
A second alternative, based on the courts' decisions in International
Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB 194 and Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. NLRB' 95 is to allow the union to know the outcome of a
settlement without knowing who the parties are or the details of the
mediation communications, thus preserving confidentiality and keeping the
union member out of the meeting where his presence may cause problems. If
the union is, upset with a series of settlements, then at bargaining time the
union member can take appropriate actions. If the settlement went against a
provision in the bargaining agreement, which section 9(a) states cannot
happen, the union can insist that the settlement be adjusted.
Third is the alternative introduced by the ALJ in United States Postal
Service & American Postal Workers Union.196 Although the ALl's ultimate
decision was overruled by the NLRB, the compromise that it proposed is
worth mentioning. The ALJ had found that the EEO regulations, which
required anonymity at the precomplaint stage, when coupled with the
underlying policies of Title VII, were significant enough to subordinate the
language of section 9(a). 197 The ALJ also found that the union had a
substantial majoritarian interest. Thus, the ALJ proffered the following: the
union would have no right to be present in the EEO precomplaint meetings,
but the settlement coming out of that meeting would not bind the union. 198
193 See supra Part II.
194 648 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
195 691 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1982).
196 281 N.L.R.B. 1015 (1986); see also supra Part III.A.
197 See United States Postal Serv. & Am. Postal Workers Union, 281 N.L.R.B. at
1024.
198 See id. at 1028.
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Thus, the union still would have a right to advance its claims under the
contract.199
Although there may be some diminution in the value of the settlement
from the meeting, the ALJ stated that the diminution should not be
overstated. 200 The ALJ stated that the union was unlikely to pursue a
grievance that was significant only to one individual when that individual
has already agreed to a settlement unless there are important institutional
interests involved.201 The Union certainly would "be less inclined to initiate
or continue to process a grievance solely to avoid being accused of failing to
fairly represent a particular claimant when the claimant has already entered
into an EEO settlement expressly relinquishing his or her own rights to
pursue the claim further." 20 2
Lastly, the union and employer can, before hand, come up with an
acceptable range of settlements for certain actions. During mediation, the
mediator could keep those parameters in mind as she facilitates the
discussion. The employee, therefore, is able to pursue his private right to
settle the issue in an informal and timely manner and is able to have a more
successful mediation because of confidentiality.
These alternatives may or may not work depending on the relationship
between the employer and the union and on the employer's and union's
willingness to negotiate and compromise over the degree confidentiality.
Whatever the solution, a confidential mediation extending to the union some
rights is better than a mediation without confidentiality at all.
VI. CONCLUSION
The second proviso of section 9(a) of the NLRA that extends to unions
the right to be present at the adjustment of grievances most likely was
enacted as the result of congressional fear that the individual adjustment of a
grievance, without the union present, might have a negative affect on the
majority. That fear, however, stops at discrimination-related disputes.
Congress, by extending to individuals the right to resolve discrimination-
related disputes outside the grievance process and to seek that resolution
through alternative dispute resolution has, as the Supreme Court holds,
199 See id.
200 See id.
201 See id.
202 Id. at 1027. The Ali, citing Gardner-Denver, went on to state that "duplication
of similar substantive rights should not be lightly diminished merely because a particular
party's incentive to settle in one forum will be discouraged by the existence of another
independent forum." Id.
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extended an individual right that trumps the majority right.
Because employees have this statutory right, the NLRA must allow
employees to use it to keep the union out of employer-initiated
discrimination-related mediations. Denying them the right not only will
inhibit the employee's right to resolve her own discrimination complaints
against congressional intentions, but also will inhibit the employee's and
employer's chance to have a successful mediation that cuts cost and time and
saves workplace relationships.
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